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CASENOTE; State v. Colburn: Montana’s rape shield law and the 
rights of an accused under the Montana Constitution 
 
Brandon Shannon 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In State v. Colburn,1 the Montana Supreme Court applied a 
balancing test to determine if evidence of prior abuse of a victim, to prove 
fabrication and an alternate source of knowledge, was improperly 
excluded under Montana’s rape shield law.2 Because Colburn’s right to 
confrontation is fundamental under the Montana Constitution, however, 
the correct test is strict scrutiny. Further, the exclusion of the evidence was 
proper because it meets strict scrutiny.  
 
II.   PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
A jury found James Morris Colburn guilty of both sexual 
intercourse without consent and sexual assault of his eleven-year-old 
neighbor, R.W.3 The jury also found Colburn guilty of incest of his eleven-
year-old daughter, C.C.4  
At trial, the State called R.W., who testified in detail that Colburn 
molested her. The State also called C.C., who described inappropriate 
touching.5 To support this testimony, the state called Nurse Practitioner 
Mary Hansen, who conducted forensic interviews of both girls.6 She stated 
that both R.W. and C.C. gave statements consistent with children who had 
been molested.7 Hansen stated that R.W. had sexual knowledge, indicating 
R.W. had been abused.8 Hansen also testified that C.C. described in detail 
inappropriate touching by her father.9  
Colburn intended to defend the charges involving his daughter, 
C.C., by attacking the interview techniques used by Hansen.10 The court 
excluded Colburn’s expert, Dr. Donna Zook, as unqualified.11 She 
                                           
1 State v. Colburn, 366 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2016). 
2 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2) (2015). 
3 Colburn, 366 P.3d at 260. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 264–65 (McKinnon, J., concurring). Justice McKinnon provides detail about C.C.’s trial 
testimony, noting that C.C. testified that Colburn touched her inappropriately, including reaching 
underneath her nightgown. Id. Surprisingly, the majority opinion opines that C.C. “denied generally 
that Colburn had done anything wrong to her.” Id. at 260 (majority opinion). 
6 Id. 
7 Colburn, 366 P.3d at 261 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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intended to opine that Hansen used leading questions in her interview of 
C.C.12  
Colburn intended to defend the charges involving R.W. by 
proving that the allegations were fabricated and that R.W. had an 
alternative source of sexual knowledge.13 Colburn’s theory was that R.W. 
fabricated the allegations against Colburn to test if her mother would 
believe her, and when her mother took the allegations seriously, R.W. felt 
safe in disclosing that her father had molested her.14 Colburn argued that 
R.W. gained the sexual knowledge disclosed in the Hansen interview from 
her father and not him.15 One month after disclosing Colburn’s abuse, 
R.W. disclosed the sexual abuse by her father, noting she only felt 
comfortable doing so because the allegations against Colburn were taken 
seriously.16 R.W.’s father was charged with incest and plead guilty to 
sexual assault.17  
Montana’s rape shield law provides:  
 
Evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim is 
inadmissible in prosecutions under this part except evidence of the 
victim’s past sexual conduct with the offender or evidence of 
specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity to show the origin 
of semen, pregnancy, or disease that is at issue in the 
prosecution.18  
 
The district court determined that R.W.’s prior molestation was 
inadmissible under this statute.19  
Colburn appealed, challenging the exclusion of Dr. Zook’s 
testimony and the exclusion of R.W.’s prior molestation, arguing the 
application of the rape shield law violated his constitutional right to 
present a defense.20  
 
III.   MAJORITY HOLDING 
 
In a short opinion authored by Chief Justice Mike McGrath, the 
majority held for Colburn on both issues and remanded the case for a new 
trial.21 First, the Court determined the district court abused its discretion 
in excluding Zook’s testmony.22  
                                           
12 Id. 
13 Colburn, 366 P.3d at 262. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 265 (McKinnon, J., concurring). 
17 Id. 
18 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2). 
19 Colburn, 366 P.3d at 262. 
20 Id. at 265. 
21 Id. at 264. 
22 Id. at 262. 
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Second, the majority held that the district court improperly applied 
the rape shield law without considering Colburn’s right to present a 
defense.23 The majority started by discussing the public policy of the rape 
shield law; that it is intended to prevent trying the victim, as the victim’s 
prior sexual history is generally irrelevant to issues of consent or the 
victims truthfulness.24 Montana’s rape shield law extends to children, and 
the policy is similar: to protect children from having to defend past abuses 
and minimizing the trauma of testifying.25  
The majority opined that conflicts can arise between rape shield 
statues and a defendant’s rights to confrontation and a defense.26 The Court 
held that a trial court must strike a balance between the defendant’s and 
victim’s rights, as neither are absolute.27 Citing past cases, it held the rape 
shield law could not mechanistically or arbitrarily exclude evidence.28 The 
majority provided guidance to trial courts, stating that they should consider 
whether the evidence is relevant and probative, whether the evidence is 
merely cumulative of the other admissible evidence, and whether the 
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.29 
The Court specified that a defendant’s evidence cannot be merely 
speculative or unsupported.30 It notes the purpose of this analysis is to 
provide a fair trial for the defendant while, at the same time, upholding the 
compelling state interest of protecting victims.31  
The Court ultimately held that the district court abused its 
discretion when it mechanistically applied the rape shield law instead of 
weighing the interests of the defendant and victim.32 Notably, while the 
Court required the balancing, it did not expressly hold that the trial court 
must admit evidence of R.W.’s prior molestation at the second trial.  
 
IV.   JUSTICE MCKINNON’S CONCURRENCE 
 
Justice McKinnon ultimately agreed with the outcome but wrote 
separately to provide guidance on how to apply the rape shield law in 
                                           
23 Id. at 264. 
24 Id. at 261–61 (citing State v. Higley, 621 P.2d 1043, 1050–1051 (Mont. 1980); Michigan v. Lucas, 
500 U.S. 145, 146 (1991); State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d 193, 199 (Mont. 1984); Tanya Bagne Marcketti, 
Rape shield laws: DO They Shield the Children, 78 IOWA L. REV. 754–55 (1993)). 
25 Colburn, 366 P.3d at 261–261 (citing Sec. 3, Ch. 172, Mont. L. 1985.; Marcketti, supra note 24, at 
754–55). 
26 Id. at 263. 
27 Id. at 262 (citing State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 30 (Mont. 1998); State v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 
1182, 1186 (Mont. 1998)). 
28 Id. at 263 (citing Johnson, 958 P.2d at 1186). 
29 Id. at 263 (citing Mont. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403 and 404; Commonwealth v. Fernsler, 715 A.2d 435, 
440 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1998); Anderson, 686 P.2d at 199). 
30 Id. at 263 (citing Johnson, 958 P.2d at 1186; State v. Lindberg, 196 P.3d 1252, 1264–65 (Mont. 
2008)). 
31 Colburn, 366 P.3d at 262 (citing Anderson, 686 P.2d at 199). 
32 Id. at 264. Interestingly, despite holding the district court abused its discretion in its application of 
the rape shield law, the standard of review the court sets forth for application of a statute is correctness. 
Colburn, 366 P.3d at 260. 
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practice.33 McKinnon noted additional factual details supplementing the 
brief majority opinion.34 She also argued that because this was an 
evidentiary and constitutional matter, the proper standard of review was 
de novo.35  
Justice McKinnon adopted the same balancing test as the majority 
for her analysis36 and recognized that the Court made exceptions to the 
rape shield law in the past.37 She suggested a two-step analysis, where a 
district court first identifies the permissible basis for admission and then 
balances the probative value of the evidence against the interest in 
protecting the integrity of the trial.38 She argued there is no blanket 
exception to the rape shield law for motive to fabricate and alternative 
source of sexual knowledge.39 Justice McKinnon argued that Colburn’s 
constitutional rights were violated when he was denied the right to explore 
the witness’s motives to fabricate and alternative source of knowledge.40 
She concluded that the district court improperly applied the rape shield 
law when it failed to balance Colburn’s rights against the interests of the 
rape shield law.41  
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
  
Criminal defendants have a right to present a meaningful defense 
under various provisions of both the Montana and Federal Constitution.42 
The exclusion of Zook’s testimony contributed to the denial of Colburn’s 
ability to present a defense. The second issue, regarding the application of 
Montana’s rape shield law, will have long-lasting effects on Montana 
jurisprudence. The majority holding, that the Montana Constitution 
requires a balancing test when applying the rape shield law, was wrongly 
decided under the Montana Constitution.  
Montana Courts have upheld the constitutionality of the rape 
shield law under the Federal Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
Montana article II, section 17 and 24, which provide rights for the 
                                           
33 Id. at 264 (McKinnon, J., concurring). 
34 Id. at 264–65. 
35 Id. at 265 (citing State v. Patterson, 291 P.3d 556, 558–559 (Mont. 2012); State v. Stock, 256 P.3d 
899, 902 (Mont. 2011); State v. Derbyshire, 201 P.3d 811, 816–17 (Mont. 2009)). 
36 Id. at 266–67 (citing Lindberg, 196 P.3d at 1264–1265; Lajoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
37 Colburn, 366 P.3d at 267 (citing Johnson, 958 P.2d at 1186; Anderson, 686 P.2d at 199) (victim’s 
prior sexual assault allegations were admissible because they were proven untrue). 
38 Id. at 267. 
39 Id. at 267–68. 
40 Id. at 268. 
41 Id. at 269. 
42 State v. Jay, 298 P.3d 396, 404 (Mont. 2013) (citations omitted); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
690 (1986) (citations omitted). This right stems from due process, compulsory process and the 
confrontation clause, though I will refer to these rights generally as the confrontation right as it is most 
relevant to Colburn. 
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accused.43 Unfortunately, the Montana Supreme Court has never clearly 
articulated the standard of scrutiny applied to the confrontation clause and 
has never decided if the Montana confrontation clause provides more 
protection than the Federal confrontation clause.  
This provides little guidance to prosecutors and criminal 
defendants under the Court’s balancing approach. Justice McKinnon 
recognized this lack of guidance; however, she conducted her analysis 
under the same incorrect balancing approach.  
 
A.   The Standard of Scrutiny 
 
In past confrontation clause challenges to the Montana rape shield 
law, the Montana Supreme Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court: “[t]he 
Sixth Amendment is not absolute, and may bow to accommodate other 
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.”44 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has also opined that lawmakers have broad latitude under the 
Constitution to institute rules precluding evidence from criminal trials.45 
The Montana Supreme Court, through the adoption of this Federal 
language, seemed to hold that the confrontation right required only a 
legitimate state interest to infringe, implying the use of a lower standard 
of scrutiny. Yet, the Montana Supreme Court went on to justify the rape 
shield law with what it described as a “compelling state interest,” implying 
a heightened standard of scrutiny.46 The Montana Supreme Court also 
relies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Chambers v. Mississippi,47 
where “rules may not be mechanistically applied to defeat the ends of 
justice.” The Montana Supreme Court is not clear on the proper standard 
of scrutiny to apply to the rape shield law under the confrontation clause. 
Further, it is unclear whether the Montana Constitution provides an 
expanded confrontation right to criminal defendants. Because the Montana 
Constitution could provide more protection for the accused, the 
Constitutional analysis in this article is conducted under the Montana 
Constitution.  
The Montana Supreme Court has held that it is not bound by the 
U.S. Supreme Court when developing the confrontation clause 
jurisprudence, as the Montana Constitution may guarantee greater rights 
than the Federal constitution.48 Yet, the Montana Supreme Court has also 
acknowledged it has not yet afforded a greater confrontation right than the 
Federal constitution.49 Under the Montana Constitution, Article II rights, 
                                           
43 State v. Howell, 839 P.2d 87, 91 (Mont. 1992); State v. Steffes, 887 P.2d 1196, 1206 (Mont. 1994). 
44 Id. at 91 (Mont. 1992) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). 
45 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). 
46 Howell, 839 P.2d at 91 (Mont. 1992) (citing State v. Van Pelt, 805 P.2d 549 (Mont. 1991). 
47 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). 
48 State v. Clark, 964 P.2d 766, 771 (Mont. 1998). 
49 City of Missoula v. Duane, 355 P.3d 729, 732–33 (Mont. 2015) (citations omitted). 
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including confrontation rights of an accused, are fundamental rights.50 In 
Montana, laws which infringe upon a fundamental right employ strict 
scrutiny.51 Thus, the proper standard of scrutiny for the confrontation 
clause under the Montana Constitution is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny 
requires both a compelling government interest and a showing by the 
government that the law is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling 
interest.52 Further, due to this heightened standard of scrutiny, the Montana 
Constitution provides more protection for the rights of the accused than 
the Federal Constitution.  
Here, Colburn presents an as-applied challenge to Montana’s rape 
shield law. Given that he was essentially denied his only defense to the 
allegations involving R.W., his confrontation right was infringed by the 
application of the rape shield law. Therefore, we analyze the application 
of the rape shield law to Colburn under strict scrutiny, by asking if the law 
is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.  
 
B.   The Compelling Government Interest 
 
The Montana Supreme Court held that the rape shield law served 
a compelling state interest in preventing a trial of a rape victim.53 While 
this is certainly a compelling interest, the rape shield law serves a myriad 
of other public policy purposes. Consider the advisory comment to the 
Federal rape shield law: 
  
[T]he rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the 
invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual 
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate 
sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the 
factfinding process. By affording victims protection in most 
instances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual misconduct 
to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged 
offenders.54  
 
There is a clear interest in protecting victims. National studies estimate 18 
percent of women are raped at some time in their lives and 63 percent of 
sexual crimes go unreported.55 There is a clear, compelling state interest 
in protecting alleged victims and encouraging victims to report assaults—
                                           
50 Clark, 964 P.2d at 771 (citations omitted). 
51 In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Mont. 1997). 
52 Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1165 (Mont. 2012). 
53 Howell, 839 P.2d at 91 (Mont. 1992) (citing Van Pelt, 805 P.2d at 549). 
54 Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory comm. n. 1. 
55 National Sexual Violence Resource Center, Statistics About Sexual Violence, NSVRC.org, 
https://perma.cc/5PCQ–LSFG (Last visited April 20, 2016). 
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this is especially true for child sexual abuse, where 88 percent of cases go 
unreported.56  
 
C.   The Narrowly-Tailored Law 
 
Instead of asking whether Montana’s rape shield law is narrowly 
tailored, the Colburn court instead held that a trial court must strike a 
balance between the defendant and victim’s rights.57 This type of interest 
balancing, however, is not part of strict scrutiny.58 Strict scrutiny is a 
balancing test, but only because it balances opposing claims.59 The 
balancing is built in, as only compelling governmental interests with a 
narrowly tailored law can outweigh an individual right.60 Interjecting an 
additional balancing element dilutes the scrutiny and gives courts broad 
discretion to strike down laws.61 In this case, this balancing test makes the 
rape shield law meaningless, as balancing essentially reverts the analysis 
to the normal evidentiary relevance analysis.  
The question the Court should address, instead of the balancing 
question, is whether the rape shield law is narrowly tailored to protecting 
victims of sexual violence, as-applied to Colburn’s situation. For a law to 
be narrowly tailored, it must advance the interest, must not be under- or 
over-inclusive, and there must not be a less restrictive alternative.62  
As applied to Colburn, the rape shield law excluded evidence that 
R.W. was molested in a prior incident by someone other than Colburn. 
First, the application advances the state interest of protecting a child from 
being traumatized during a cross examination where she is forced to 
discuss a prior molestation. This protection also serves to promote 
reporting and prosecuting sexual crimes. Even in the case of child victims, 
the rape shield protections make guardians, counselors, and prosecutors 
less hesitant to bring a case forward. Thus, in Colburn’s case, the 
compelling state interest is advanced by the application of the rape shield 
statute.  
The law is not under- or over-inclusive and there is no less 
restrictive alternative. Under Montana’s rape shield law, all sexual conduct 
of the victim is excluded, with the narrow exceptions for sexual conduct 
between the victim and defendant as well as evidence showing the origin 
of semen, pregnancy, or disease. Allowing any additional evidence of the 
                                           
56 Id. 
57 Colburn, 366 P.3d at 262 (majority opinion) (citing State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 30 (Mont. 
1998); State v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Mont. 1998)). This balancing test is used in the Federal 
courts. See Lajoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
58 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1265 (2011). 
59 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2438–40 (1996). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 2422 (collecting cases).  
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victim’s sexual conduct would fail to protect victims and subject them to 
a harassing cross examination. In Colburn’s case, there is no way to allow 
cross examination about prior sexual abuse without violating the 
protection provided to the victim. Thus, the application to Colburn is 
narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest.  
Given this, even under strict scrutiny, the application of the rape 
shield law to exclude evidence of R.W.’s prior abuse does not violate 
Colburn’s rights because the law is narrowly tailored to a compelling state 
interest.  
 
D.   The Future of Montana’s Rape Shield Statute 
 
The majority likely applied the improper balancing test instead of 
true strict scrutiny because it seemed unfair that Colburn was essentially 
denied his entire defense. Whether this is an equitable outcome or not, the 
Court’s job is to determine whether the statute violates an individual’s 
right, not whether the statute is fair. The fairness question is one for the 
legislature.  
The Federal rape shield law may be a good model for legislators 
pondering the future of Montana’s rape shield statute. Montana’s rape 
shield law precludes evidence of all “sexual conduct” of a victim in 
prosecutions of sexual crimes and provides two exceptions: sexual 
conduct between the victim and offender or evidence to show the “origin 
of semen, pregnancy, or disease.”63 The Federal rape shield law64 
precludes a victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition in both 
criminal and civil matters alleging sexual misconduct and provides three 
exceptions.65 The first two exceptions are similar to Montana’s; however, 
the third exception is for “evidence whose exclusion would violate the 
defendant’s constitutional rights.”66 The comments note the protections 
extend to the victim “except in designated circumstances in which the 
probative value of the evidence significantly outweighs possible harm to 
the victim.”67 The comments further elaborate on this:  
 
[E]vidence of specific instances of conduct may not be excluded 
if the result would be to deny a criminal defendant the protections 
afforded by the Constitution. For example, statements in which 
the victim has expressed an intent to have sex with the first person 
encountered on a particular occasion might not be excluded 
without violating the due process right of a rape defendant seeking 
                                           
63 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2). 
64 Fed. R. Evid. 412. The Federal rape shield law is in the Federal rules of evidence in the article on 
relevance; the Montana rape shield law is in the criminal code. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory comm. n. 2 (emphasis added). 
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to prove consent . . . in various circumstances a defendant may 
have a right to introduce evidence otherwise precluded by an 
evidence rule under the Confrontation Clause.68  
 
Under the Federal rape shield law, there are instances where a 
confrontation right may allow evidence otherwise excluded by the law, 
such as in Colburn’s case. Along with these expanded rights for 
defendants, the Federal law provides broader protection for victims as 
well, extending the protection to civil trials and a range of topics broader 
than just “sexual conduct of the victim.”69  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
Several decades of Montana case law has failed to clearly 
articulate the confrontation protection provided by the Montana 
Constitution. This has led the Court to apply an improper balancing test. 
Because the confrontation right is a fundamental right, the proper test is 
strict scrutiny. Under this test, the exclusions of Colburn’s proffered 
evidence was proper because Montana’s rape shield law is narrowly 
tailored to a compelling state interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
68 Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory comm. n. 17. 
69 Montana Courts have held that “sexual conduct of the victim” includes child sexual abuse. Howell, 
839 P.2d at 92 (citations omitted). 
